• A non-governmental organization (NGO) can invest in a public good.
Introduction
The responsibility for providing public goods is often delegated to non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The question then naturally arises: Should the state maintain ownership, or should the NGO become the owner, in particular when the NGO is also the key investor?
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E-mail address: patrick.schmitz@uni-koeln.de. (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995) , which has become the leading paradigm in the modern theory of the firm. 1 The simplest version of the basic property rights model works as follows. Consider two parties who can generate a surplus when they collaborate tomorrow. If the parties will not agree on collaboration, the party who owns the relevant assets will still be able to generate a surplus, albeit smaller than the collaboration surplus. Suppose that today one of the two parties has to make an important investment decision. The central result of the property rights theory is that this party should be the owner. The reason is that tomorrow the parties will agree to collaborate and divide 1 See Segal and Whinston (2013) Table 2 The parties' payoffs.
Payoff of party
the collaboration surplus according to the split-the-difference rule. Hence, each party gets its disagreement payoff plus half of the additional surplus that is generated by collaboration. Ownership thus increases the share of the total surplus that a party will get tomorrow, so the investing party should be the owner in order to improve its incentives to invest.
In the present paper, we bring together two important variants of the basic incomplete contracting model (see Table 1 ).
First, Chiu (1998) and Lockwood (1998) have shown that the conclusions of the basic property rights model crucially rely on whether the ex post negotiations between the parties are modeled using the split-the-difference rule or the dealme-out solution.
2 According to the deal-me-out solution, each party gets half of the collaboration surplus, except when one party's disagreement payoff is larger than half of the collaboration surplus. In the latter case, the party with the large disagreement payoff gets its disagreement payoff, while the other party is residual claimant. If the bargaining solution is given by the deal-me-out rule, then it may be optimal to make the non-investing party the owner of the relevant assets, which is never the case in the standard property rights model. 3 In particular, if the non-investing party is the owner, then the investing party can become residual claimant, so it may even have first-best investment incentives.
Second, Besley and Ghatak (2001) have applied the property rights approach to a public goods setting. 4 In this setting, even the non-owner gets a surplus in the case of disagreement, since the owner provides a public good. Besley and Ghatak (2001) follow the standard property rights approach in assuming that the bargaining outcome is given by the split-the-difference rule. It turns out that in Besley and Ghatak's (2001) model the party who has a larger valuation of the public good should always be the owner, even when the other party is the key investor.
The goal of the present contribution is to investigate whether Besley and Ghatak's (2001) important insights are robust when the split-the-difference rule is replaced by the deal-me-out rule. Is it still true that the party who values the public good most should always be the owner, or does the optimal ownership structure crucially depend on whether the split-the-difference rule or the 2 We follow the wording of Binmore et al. (1989) , which is also used by De Meza and Lockwood (1998).
3 Giving ownership to a non-investing party may also be optimal in property rights models in which the investing party has private information about its disagreement payoff (see Schmitz, 2006) . deal-me-out solution is applied, as it is the case in a private goods framework? Moreover, may the deal-me-out solution even yield first-best investment incentives for a party as in the case of private goods? These questions are important, since the deal-me-out solution may be at least as plausible as the split-the-difference rule. 5 In laboratory experiments, the deal-me-out solution predicts well, as has been emphasized by Binmore et al. (1989) . There are convincing non-cooperative bargaining games in support of each of the two sharing rules. For instance, in Chiu and Yang's (1999) infinite horizon bargaining game, the choice between the two approaches depends on the length of time that taking an outside option restricts a party from reverting to collaboration with the other party. 
The model
There are two parties, G (the government) and N (a nongovernmental organization, NGO). At an initial date 0, the parties agree on an ownership structure o ∈ {G, N}. At date 1, the NGO chooses an observable but non-contractible investment level i ≥ 0.
In line with the incomplete contracting approach (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995) , it is assumed that ex ante it is not possible to write a contract that specifies ex post collaboration of the parties.
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At date 2, the parties can write a contract specifying collaboration to provide a public good. If the two parties agree to collaborate, they together provide the quantity y(i) of the public good, where
, and y ′′ < 0. If the parties do not collaborate at date 2, the provided quantity of the public good depends on the ownership structure. In particular, in the case of disagreement the quantity of the public good is
oration is always ex post efficient. Moreover, since the NGO is the investing party, in the case of disagreement a larger fraction of the NGO's investments can be used when the NGO is the owner. Let the government's valuation of the public good be denoted by θ G > 0, while the non-governmental organization's valuation is denoted by θ N > 0. Thus, the parties' payoffs are as depicted in Table 2 , where t is a transfer payment from the government to the NGO.
The first best-benchmark. Note that the total surplus (θ G + θ N )y(i) − i is maximized by the investment level i FB , which is implicitly characterized by the first-order condition
5 Moreover, the questions are also interesting as De Meza and Lockwood (2004) have shown that even in the case of the deal-me-out solution the investing party should always be the owner when there are sufficiently strong spillovers in a private good setting. One might hence suspect that this result carries over to the case of public goods. Yet, we will show that this is not the case. 6 See also Muthoo (1999) , who provides comprehensive discussions of noncooperative bargaining games with alternating offers that may lead to the splitthe-difference or the deal-me-out division. 7 For detailed discussions of the incomplete contracting paradigm, see Hart and
Moore (1999) and Maskin and Tirole (1999) .
Split-the-difference
Besley and Ghatak (2001) follow the standard property rights approach and apply the split-the-difference rule to model the date-2 negotiations. Hence, under ownership structure o ∈ {G, N}, at date 2 the parties agree on a transfer payment t such that each party gets its default payoff plus half of the renegotiation surplus
Thus, given ownership structure o ∈ {G, N}, the NGO's ex ante payoff is given by
and the government's payoff is given by
As a consequence, at date 1 the NGO chooses the investment level i o , which is implicitly characterized by
Note that there is always underinvestment compared to the first-best solution, because the NGO's marginal return
Due to concavity of the total surplus, this means that it is always optimal that the party who has a larger valuation of the public good is the owner. In particular, even though the NGO is the investing party, ownership by the government can be optimal, which is in contrast to the standard property rights theory with private goods. 8 Intuitively, when party G has a larger valuation of the public good, then N's investment improves the default payoff and thus the bargaining position of party G more than its own bargaining position, so making party G the owner is optimal as this reduces the impact of the default payoffs on the bargaining outcome.
Deal-me-out
We now explore whether Besley and Ghatak's (2001) central insight is robust when we replace the split-the-difference rule by the deal-me-out solution.
Thus, we now suppose that at date 2 the parties split the collaboration surplus (θ G + θ N )y(i) equally, except when one party's default payoff is larger than half of the collaboration surplus.
9 If party G's default payoff θ G λ o y(i) is larger than 8 Schmitz (2013) has shown that when the regular Nash bargaining solution is replaced by the generalized Nash bargaining solution (i.e., if the renegotiation surplus is split unequally), then Besley and Ghatak's (2001) result that the party who values the public good most should always be the owner no longer holds. Yet, it is still true that only the relationship between θ G and θ N matters for the optimal ownership structure, while the investment technology is irrelevant (i.e., in contrast to the private good case, N-ownership is not always optimal, even though only party N has to make a relevant investment decision). 9 Note that it is not possible that both parties' default payoffs are larger than half of the collaboration surplus, because the sum of the default payoffs
Hence, given ownership structure o ∈ {G, N}, the NGO's ex ante payoff is given by
We can now analyze the NGO's investment decision at date 1.
Suppose first that θ G ≥ θ N . In this case, the NGO maximizes
Thus, the investment level is characterized by
Note that there is always underinvestment with regard to the firstbest benchmark, so concavity of the total surplus implies that the ownership structure that leads to the larger investment level is optimal. Finally, o = G is also optimal if λ G ≤ 1 2
Recall that in the case of the split-the-difference rule, when θ G ≥ θ N , then the investment level is characterized by
Note that the investment level is larger in the case of the deal-me-out solution, because both
In this case, the investment level is characterized by
In the case of the split-the-difference rule, if θ G < θ N , then the investment level is implicitly given by 
To summarize, the following results hold. 
Conclusions
Besley and Ghatak (2001) have shown that in the case of public goods, ownership should reside with the party that cares most about the project, even if the other party is the key investor. We have demonstrated that Besley and Ghatak's (2001) central insight is robust when the split-the-difference rule is replaced by the dealme-out solution. 10 Our finding thus highlights another important difference between the public good and the private good settings, as Chiu (1998) and Lockwood (1998) have shown that the central insights of the property rights theory are not robust with regard to the deal-me-out solution in the case of private goods. Moreover, it has turned out that in contrast to the case of private goods, with public goods it is not possible to provide firstbest investment incentives, even when the bargaining outcome is given by the deal-me-out solution.
